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INTRODUCTION 
Understanding of the climate change phenomenon is relatively new.1 Although 
acceptance of the phenomenon is now widespread, there is no consensus over the 
scope of each pollutant’s contribution to the problem and, even more so, an effective 
response to the issue.2 Nevertheless, abundant scientific evidence shows that the 
                                                                                                                 
 
  J.D. Candidate 2019, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A. 2016, 
Vanderbilt University. I would like to thank the entire Indiana Law Journal Board of Editors 
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 1. Roberta Mann, Waiting to Exhale?: Global Warming and Tax Policy, 51 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1135, 1141 (2002) (“[G]lobal warming first entered the public consciousness in the late 
1980s . . . .”); see also William W. Kellogg & Robert Schware, Society, Science and Climate 
Change, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 1076, 1078–79 (1982). 
 2. See Michelle S. Simon & William Pentland, Reliable Science: Overcoming Public 
Doubts in the Climate Change Debate, 37 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 219, 224–
31 (2012); Brad Balukjian, Why Doesn’t Everyone Believe Humans Are Causing Climate 
Change?, PBS: NOVA (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/climate-
change-acceptance [https://perma.cc/N8WB-TJZU]. 
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“greenhouse effect” is caused by the release of greenhouse gases, most notably 
carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide, due to human activities.3 Increased greenhouse gas 
emissions cause Earth’s temperature to rise, destroying habitat and increasing the 
scarcity of natural resources.4 The largest contributor to this problem is the air 
pollution that results from the burning of fossil fuels.5 Other by-products of fossil 
fuels further impact human welfare, most of which are attributable specifically to the 
burning of coal.6 This impact extends to include major health costs.7 Climate change 
has advanced past the point of possible complete remediation, necessitating the 
regulation of the costs that manifest themselves both socially and economically. 
Many national governments have recognized and acted on the pressing need to 
address and reduce the level of air pollution emitted by the world’s industry. It falls 
to government to ensure that these costs are “accounted for in economic assessments 
to avoid making irresponsible investment choices.”8 The classic way to account for 
negative externalities, such as air pollution, is by implementing a “corrective tax.”9 
Such tax imposes additional costs on the polluter, which forces the firm to internalize 
the cost. Ultimately, any emissions regulation is aimed at making clean air 
alternatives more attractive and encouraging overall energy conservation.10 The best 
method of regulation may be disputed, but climate change is now recognized as a 
public and political issue, as opposed to solely a scientific issue.11 Accordingly, 
governments began playing a bigger role in climate policy in the late 1980s.12 The 
“transitional year” of 1988 marked the Toronto Conference and United Nations 
General Assembly resolution on climate change, both of which recommended that 
states develop their own framework to confront the dangers of global warming.13 
While climate policy is normally an item on the national political agenda, individual 
states have recently become the focus and hoped-for origin of headway on climate 
change policy. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 3. E.g., FRANK P. INCROPERA, CLIMATE CHANGE: A WICKED PROBLEM 53 (2016) (“Since 
the Industrial Revolution, both the concentration of CO2 and the rate at which it is increasing 
exceed levels experienced at any time in the previous 2 million years. The carbon cycle has 
become unbalanced.”); David Pearce, The Role of Carbon Taxes in Adjusting to Global 
Warming, 101 ECON. J. 938, 938 (1991). 
 4. See INCROPERA, supra note 3, at 78. 
 5. Kellogg & Schware, supra note 1, at 1077. 
 6. Coal emits higher levels of carbon dioxide than other fossil fuels. See id. at 1083. 
 7. Such health impacts include premature deaths resulting from respiratory and 
cardiovascular conditions caused by reduced air quality and rising healthcare costs. GLOB. 
COMM’N ON THE ECON. & CLIMATE, THE SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE IMPERATIVE: 
FINANCING FOR BETTER GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 69 (2016); see also Donald B. Marron & 
Eric J. Toder, Tax Policy Issues in Designing a Carbon Tax, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 563 (2014). 
 8. See GLOB. COMM’N ON THE ECON. & CLIMATE, supra note 7, at 70. 
 9. David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Using Taxes to Improve Cap and Trade, Part I: 
Distribution, 75 ST. TAX NOTES 99, 100 (2015). 
 10. E.g., Pearce, supra note 3, at 939. 
 11. See Daniel Bodansky, The History of the Global Climate Change Regime, in 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 23, 24–27 (Urs Luterbacher & 
Detlef F. Sprinz eds., 2001). 
 12. See id. 
 13. Id. at 25, 28. 
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This Note uses two recent Massachusetts carbon tax proposals to discuss the costs 
and benefits of such state-level climate change legislation but discusses similar 
regional proposals as well. Although a state carbon tax poses some limitations and 
concern for the increased tax burden relative to other states that have not imposed a 
tax, the adoption of state carbon taxes represents an important advancement in 
climate policy. Part I overviews legislative tactics used to combat climate change 
thus far, including common policy responses, and the current attitude of federal 
legislators toward the global climate crisis. Part II introduces the advantages and 
common criticisms of a carbon tax policy and concludes that a carbon tax would be 
an effective policy option. Next, Part III discusses recent state carbon tax proposals, 
focusing on the efforts of northeastern states to enact the nation’s first carbon tax 
law. Two Massachusetts proposals, Senate Bill 1821 and House Bill 1726, are 
introduced to provide the basis for an analysis of state carbon taxes. Finally, Part IV 
discusses the possibility of effective state-level climate change policy and analyzes 
the costs and benefits of the Massachusetts state proposals. This Note argues that 
states, especially population-dense states such as Massachusetts, should adopt state-
level carbon taxes to reduce their respective share of carbon emissions and supply 
momentum to the climate change movement. 
I. FIGHTING THE GLOBAL CLIMATE CRISIS WITH CLIMATE LEGISLATION 
This Part outlines the policies typically proposed and utilized by politicians and 
explains the attractiveness of these policies, most notably their status as nontax 
options. These policy options, albeit more readily accepted by legislatures, have a 
limited ability to influence consumer behavior thereby reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. This Part also briefly discusses past and present U.S. climate change 
policy and obstacles to the passage of such legislation at the federal level, particularly 
carbon taxes. 
A. Policy Options 
1. Cap-and-Trade Programs 
Cap-and-trade programs are the preferred method of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions by virtually all jurisdictions that have embraced climate change policy.14 
Reuven Avi-Yonah and David Uhlmann point out that the most promising proposals, 
both in the United States and abroad, are market-based cap-and-trade systems.15 
Policymakers inclined to impose a price on emissions tend to already gravitate 
toward nontax options, but a cap-and-trade program also fulfills the reduction goals 
                                                                                                                 
 
 14. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate Change: 
Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 3, 5 (2009) (discussing the popularity of cap-and-trade systems). 
 15. Id.; see also Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade and 
Complementary Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 207–08, 222 (2012) (explaining how the 
U.S. delegation’s position to the Kyoto climate negotiations was central to the popularity of 
cap and trade). The European Union has the most extensive cap-and-trade program to date, 
involving thirty member countries and covering forty percent of all EU emissions. Id. at 223. 
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of environmental advocates, introduces market incentives for industry, and complies 
with economic principles of efficient pricing.16 
Under a cap-and-trade regime, the government determines the cap on total 
emissions and distributes allowances, issued via permits, equal to this total.17 
Businesses must then decide whether to use their allowances or sell them to another 
firm for market price,18 however, there is a monetary incentive to reduce emissions 
either way.19 Ann Carlson argues that cap and trade is best suited to the “temporal 
and spatial fungibility” of greenhouse gases.20 Because the negative externalities are 
not concentrated to the time and location at which they were emitted, firms can 
“bank[] and borrow[]” allowances in the most cost-effective way.21 In another vein, 
cap-and-trade systems are politically appealing to both legislators and businesses 
because the allowances of such programs function as “legislatively created wealth.”22 
The ability to shape cap-and-trade programs to “create winners and losers” makes it 
easier to gain political support, thus pushing it to a vote.23 
On the other hand, despite the ability to influence behavior to reduce emissions, 
cap-and-trade systems present additional administrative burdens. For instance, there 
is an inherent difficulty in setting emission-reduction targets. Regulators must also 
implement oversight mechanisms to monitor emissions and allowance trades 
between firms.24 This proves to be exceedingly difficult because these exchanges 
“can take on layers of complexity that are susceptible to speculation and volatility.”25 
These allowance trades also challenge the level of price certainty any cap-and-trade 
program is able to guarantee, making the cost of emission reductions somewhat 
unpredictable.26 Furthermore, consumers still bear the ultimate cost of pricing carbon 
through cap and trade. Taking California’s cap-and-trade regime, AB 32, for 
instance, any reduction in greenhouse gas emissions would cause a corresponding 
increase in gasoline, electricity, and industrial product prices.27 
While cap-and-trade programs are currently the preferred approach by many 
national and subnational governments across the globe, a superior cap-and-trade 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 14. 
 17. LEONARD E. BURMAN & JOEL SLEMROD, TAXES IN AMERICA: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS 
TO KNOW 13 (2013). 
 18. Lawrence H. Goulder & Andrew Schein, Carbon Taxes vs. Cap and Trade: A Critical 
Review 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19338, 2013), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19338.pdf [https://perma.cc/FGR3-HTC2]; see also Carlson, 
supra note 15, at 209. 
 19. BURMAN & SLEMROD, supra note 17, at 13–14 (“If . . . the implicit tax due to the 
market price of the permits, is equal to the social cost of the polluting activity, then decision-
makers are induced to take heed of the social cost of their actions.”). 
 20. Carlson, supra note 15, at 216. 
 21. Id. at 215–16. 
 22. SHI-LING HSU, THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX: GETTING PAST OUR HANG-UPS TO 
EFFECTIVE CLIMATE POLICY 121 (2011). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Goulder & Schein, supra note 18, at 12. 
 25. INCROPERA, supra note 3, at 149. 
 26. Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 14, at 6. 
 27. Gamage & Shanske, supra note 9, at 100–01. 
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design would include “tax elements.”28 Mark Gergen, a proponent of state-level 
legislation, has argued that a carbon tax should supplement a cap-and-trade 
program.29 He proposes using two separate taxes to set the maximum and minimum 
prices of allowances in a cap-and-trade system, a method he calls “wrapping a carbon 
tax around cap and trade.”30 Requiring firms to purchase permits, rather than freely 
distributing them, increases efficiency because firms will only acquire the necessary 
number of allowances and no more. Firms must use their limited number of credits 
to obtain allowances or otherwise pay a tax determined by the “wrap around” carbon 
taxes. Crafty businesses will sort out the optimal configuration of redeeming credits, 
but the incentive to use as few as possible is constant. Other commentators agree and 
argue that it is easier to make the case for a more flexible hybrid cap-and-trade policy 
that regulates permit prices with either a carbon price floor or ceiling (or both).31 
2. Command-and-Control Regulations 
Through command-and-control regulations, the government mandates that firms 
adopt a certain “pollution abatement technology” or sets a range of energy choices 
for each source of greenhouse gas emissions.32 These regulations may take the form 
of renewable portfolio standards for power production, automobile-efficiency 
standards, or other standards for buildings and appliances.33 For instance, corporate 
average fuel economy (CAFE) standards set efficiency standards for automobiles,34 
a larger source of emissions than the nation’s power plants.35 This regulatory 
approach provides lawmakers with additional nontax alternatives and is preferred by 
those who would rather not guess as to the optimal quantity of greenhouse gases 
given the economic cost of reducing the emissions.36 
The structure of command-and-control systems, while seemingly simple, limits 
the potential reduction in greenhouse gas emissions that might otherwise be 
achievable under a different policy option. These regulations provide polluters with 
                                                                                                                 
 
 28. Id. at 99 (arguing that tax elements would make the California cap-and-trade regime 
fairer to disadvantaged populations and mitigate negative effects on economic growth). 
 29. Mark P. Gergen, The Case in Economic Theory for Wrapping a Carbon Tax Around 
Cap and Trade 2, 9–10 (Aug. 27, 2013) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law 
Journal). 
 30. Id. at 2. 
 31. Goulder & Schein, supra note 18, at 3; Luca Taschini, Simon Dietz & Naomi Hicks, 
Grantham Research Inst. on Climate Change and the Env’t, Carbon Tax v Cap-and-Trade: 
Which Is Better?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 31, 2013, 8:59 AM), https://www.theguardian 
.com/environment/2013/jan/31/carbon-tax-cap-and-trade [https://perma.cc/65C4-UEHR]. 
 32. Gary M. Lucas, Jr., Behavioral Public Choice and the Carbon Tax, 2017 UTAH L. 
REV. 115, 127. 
 33. See ROGER C. DOWER & MARY BETH ZIMMERMAN, WORLD RES. INST., THE RIGHT 
CLIMATE FOR CARBON TAXES: CREATING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO PROTECT THE 
ATMOSPHERE 1, 4 (1992); INCROPERA, supra note 3, at 148. 
 34. INCROPERA, supra note 3, at 148. 
 35. Hiroko Tabuchi, U.S. Climate Change Policy: Made in California, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/climate/california-climate-change.html 
[https://perma.cc/A9VK-6C69]. 
 36. Gamage & Shanske, supra note 9, at 100. 
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no incentive to seek alternative, cheaper ways to reduce a particular source’s carbon 
emissions past the required standard.37 Instead of continuing to innovate and search 
for more efficient technologies or production methods, these regulations encourage 
polluters to sit on their hands once reaching the minimum requirement. 
The administrative burden of implementing and managing a command-and-
control regime is also quite large. The government must identify the most 
inexpensive ways to limit each source of carbon emissions. This requires massive 
amounts of information that the government would have to collect anew.38 The 
government would also be responsible for establishing a system to monitor each 
source’s ability to comply with these requirements.39 Lastly, command-and-control 
regulations are regressive in that the ultimate cost is passed down to consumers in 
the form of higher prices for goods and services.40 For example, emissions standards 
increase the price of cheaper vehicles, which are more likely to be purchased by low-
income households, by the same amount as more expensive vehicles.41 These 
regulations, unlike carbon taxes, cannot self-correct because they generate no 
revenue.42 
3. Other Government Regulations and Subsidies 
Governments have also used subsidy programs to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by incentivizing investment in low-carbon technologies and eco-friendly 
goods.43 Congress has used tax credits, deductions, and shorter depreciation recovery 
periods to encourage investment in alternative energy sources.44 Specific examples 
include “the income tax credit for hybrid cars and subsidies for corn-based ethanol, 
the hydrogen fuel cell, and carbon sequestration technology.”45 Although the public 
highly favors subsidy programs as a climate change policy, some scholars believe 
that they should not be more than a supplementary component of any government’s 
climate policy.46 Nevertheless, green subsidies may stimulate technological 
advancement and produce positive externalities in the form of reduced cost for 
some.47 
                                                                                                                 
 
 37. Lucas, supra note 32, at 127–28; see also DOWER & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 33, at 4. 
 38. Lucas, supra note 32, at 127. 
 39. DOWER & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 33, at 4. 
 40. Lucas, supra note 32, at 128. 
 41. IAN W.H. PARRY, HILARY SIGMAN, MARGARET WALLS & ROBERTON C. WILLIAMS III, 
RES. FOR THE FUTURE, THE INCIDENCE OF POLLUTION CONTROL POLICIES 16–17 (2005); see also 
Lucas, supra note 32, at 128. 
 42. Lucas, supra note 32, at 128. 
 43. Id. at 129. 
 44. Kathryn Kisska-Schulze & Darren A. Prum, States Taxing Carbon: Proposing 
Flexibility and Harmonization in the Movement Toward Environmental Reform in the U.S., 
40 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 87, 102–03 (2017). 
 45. Lucas, supra note 32, at 129. 
 46. “[N]ot even the love-starved, benefit-distributing US Congress would take the 
extreme position of relying only on subsidization as a climate policy.” HSU, supra note 22, at 
121 (emphasis in original). 
 47. Michael Waggoner, Why and How to Tax Carbon, 20 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 1, 32 (2008). 
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On the other hand, subsidy programs pose significant economic efficiency issues. 
As with command-and-control regulations, governments must rely on large amounts 
of information that they do not readily possess to determine the activities that should 
be subsidized.48 Furthermore, the sheer political attractiveness of subsidies functions 
as a barrier to fulfilling the environmental objectives of such a policy.49 Subsidies 
attract the attention of special interests, causing the environmental considerations of 
the program to be dwarfed by the objectives of self-interested lobbyists. Even more 
fundamental, green subsidies are extremely expensive to sustain.50 The combination 
of high cost and possibility of negligible emission reductions makes subsidy 
programs a less effective policy option both economically and environmentally. 
B. United States Policy Toward Climate Change 
Many economists and policymakers believe that successfully addressing global 
climate change must come from the international community as a whole,51 but this 
has not dissuaded national or even subnational legislative bodies from enacting 
climate change legislation. Throughout the twentieth century, U.S. energy and tax 
policy has moved between encouraging energy conservation and favoring big oil and 
gas.52 Nevertheless, the federal government has been active in climate policy for the 
last few decades (with the exception of the Reagan administration), enacting several 
excise taxes on fossil fuels and introducing tax credits for renewable energy.53 More 
recently, the Obama administration unsuccessfully attempted to get Congress to 
adopt comprehensive climate change legislation, but nonetheless took steps to 
commit the United States to more environmentally friendly policies.54 
Through the course of his 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump promised 
the repeal of many policies set by President Obama.55 This included climate policy, 
specifically aid to the United Nations Green Climate Fund and the Clean Power 
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. Lucas, supra note 32, at 129; see also Kisska-Schulze & Prum, supra note 44, at 103. 
 49. See Lucas, supra note 32, at 129. 
 50. Id.  
 51. E.g., HSU, supra note 22, at 2, 5; Lucas, supra note 32, at 124 (“Climate change is a 
global problem and addressing it will require global cooperation.”); Emily Richman, Note, 
Emissions Trading and the Development Critique: Exposing the Threat to Developing 
Countries, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 133, 133 (2003) (“A number of economists and legal 
thinkers have asserted that an international emissions trading scheme is the most efficient way 
to reduce the carbon emissions that cause climate change.”); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 20–21. 
 52. Kisska-Schulze & Prum, supra note 44, at 101. 
 53. Id. at 101–02 (“One legal scholar asserts that the United States’ approach to use tax 
policy as a pollution-reducing tool made it the world’s leader at the time.”). 
 54. Id. at 103; see infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 55. See Trump Promise Tracker, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/graphics/politics/trump-promise-tracker/?utm_term=.b46ebb4732dc [https://perma.cc/E5KB 
-E3M9] (last updated Sept. 17, 2018). 
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Plan,56 which set limits on carbon emissions for each state’s power plants.57 President 
Donald Trump honored these campaign promises and began unwinding federal 
involvement in climate change policy. Specific changes included rolling back 
programs on vehicle fuel efficiency standards and groundwater protections and 
proposing major budget cuts to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).58 
President Trump has also filled many positions that exert influence over the direction 
of U.S. climate policy with vocal climate change skeptics, most notably 
Administrator of the EPA.59 In June 2017, the Trump administration pulled the 
United States out of the Paris Agreement, a global coalition assembled to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.60 This trend of opposition to federal climate change action 
is mirrored by the legislature. For each effort to enact a federal carbon tax, “there 
ha[s] been equal and parallel legislative endeavors to . . . curb climate action.”61 
The enactment of federal carbon taxes in particular faces certain political 
difficulties, both directly from political opponents and indirectly from the biases of 
voters. The coal and electricity industries’ political influence effectively serves as a 
veto against any carbon tax proposal.62 On the voter side, there is a perception that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 56. Ali Vitali, Trump Pulls U.S. Out of Paris Climate Agreement, NBC NEWS (June 1, 
2017, 8:47 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-pulls-u-s-out-paris 
-climate-agreement-n767066 [https://perma.cc/CP27-DDXN]; see also Rebecca Harrington, 
President-Elect Donald Trump Doesn’t Believe in Climate Change. Here’s His Platform on 
the Environment, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 9, 2016, 10:44 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com 
/donald-trump-climate-change-global-warming-environment-policies-plans-platforms-2016 
-10 [https://perma.cc/JEE4-Y2KJ]. 
 57. Lucas, supra note 32, at 118. 
 58. Rebecca Gasper, Timeline: Trump’s 100 Days of Rollbacks to Climate Action, WORLD 
RESOURCES INST. (Apr. 26, 2017), http://www.wri.org/blog/2017/04/timeline-trumps-100 
-days-rollbacks-climate-action [https://perma.cc/2WAF-WRXL]. 
 59. Shi-Ling Hsu, A Complete Analysis of Carbon Taxation: Considering the Revenue 
Side, 65 BUFFALO L. REV. 857, 858 (2017). In July 2018, Scott Pruitt, Administrator of the 
EPA, resigned amid allegations of legal and ethical scandal. Coral Davenport, Lisa Friedman 
& Maggie Haberman, E.P.A. Chief Scott Pruitt Resigns Under a Cloud of Ethics Scandals, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/climate/scott-pruitt-epa 
-trump.html [https://perma.cc/9M3X-GBR3]. 
 60. Hsu, supra note 59, at 858–59. President Barack Obama had previously committed 
the United States to lowering its emissions by twenty-six to twenty-eight percent. THE WHITE 
HOUSE, PRESIDENT OBAMA’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 2 (2015), https://obamawhitehouse 
.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cap_progress_report_final_w_cover.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/5SRQ-B6JP]; see also Chelsea Harvey, Defying Trump, These State Leaders Are Trying 
to Impose Their Own Carbon Taxes, WASH. POST (May 12, 2017), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/05/12/defying-trump-these-state 
-leaders-are-trying-to-impose-their-own-carbon-taxes/?utm_term=.063039c452b8 [https:// 
perma.cc/4RXD-VMP9]. 
 61. Kisska-Schulze & Prum, supra note 44, at 104 (“Initiatives include the No Carbon 
Tax Act of 2013 . . . and the American Energy Renaissance Act of 2015, which proposes to 
amend the Clean Air Act to exclude GHGs from the definition of ‘air pollutant’ and to repeal 
current rulemaking for carbon pollution standards for power plants.”). 
 62. HSU, supra note 22, at 120 (“While coal-heavy states such as West Virginia have 
exerted pressure through their elected representatives, electricity-generating firms have 
worked through one of the most powerful trade associations in the world, the Edison Electric 
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energy usage is inelastic, which would make adjusting to a carbon tax nearly 
impossible for low-income consumers’ budgets.63 Politicians have manipulated this 
perception to advocate against such a tax.64 There is also a perception of unequal 
distribution across states, which hampers the political feasibility of carbon pricing.65 
These challenges persist even though several Republican officials have expressed a 
preference for a carbon tax over other alternatives.66 
II. CARBON TAXES—THE BEST POLICY? 
This Part focuses on the carbon tax as a climate change policy option. While the 
previously discussed policies present certain limitations, a tax option would 
eliminate efficiency and implementation concerns and allow for a broader societal 
and environmental impact. The discussion covers four main aspects of the carbon 
tax: superior economic efficiency, generation of revenue, regressiveness, and 
practicality. The Part concludes that a carbon tax would be the most efficient climate 
change policy option with the greatest positive environmental outcomes. 
A. Economic Efficiency 
The U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) determined a carbon tax to be the 
most efficient among options for reducing carbon dioxide emissions.67 Most 
economists agree that an optimal carbon tax, set as the marginal social cost of 
emitting carbon, would create the most economically efficient reduction in activities 
that produce carbon emissions.68 Ideally, the tax would be collected far upstream and 
applied to a limited number of firms at the point the fossil fuel enters the economy, 
such as the coal mine head, oil refinery, or wellhead.69 After initial implementation 
hurdles,70 focus on applying the tax to the gatekeepers of the stream of commerce 
would allow the tax to be administered more simply.71 It would also create a broad 
                                                                                                                 
 
Institute . . . .”). 
 63. Id. at 125–26. 
 64. Id. (debunking this argument against carbon taxes and asserting that low-income 
individuals and households are able to find ways to substitute energy sources). 
 65. Roberton C. Williams III, Hal Gordon, Dallas Burtraw, Jared C. Carbone & Richard 
D. Morgenstern, The Initial Incidence of a Carbon Tax Across U.S. States, 67 NAT’L TAX J. 
807, 807–08 (2014). 
 66. Carbon tax options have also garnered support from prominent business leaders. Hsu, 
supra note 59, at 860–61. 
 67. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, POLICY OPTIONS FOR REDUCING CO2 EMISSIONS, at viii (2008), 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-2007-2008/reports/02-12-carbon.pdf 
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tax base with influence over each subsequent choice made by producers and 
consumers. Polluters will adapt to use production methods that emit less carbon or 
else pay the tax. Additionally, because the burning of fossil fuels will be taxed in 
proportion to the carbon emitted, the consumption of coal, the largest emitter, will 
be taxed most heavily, resulting in a reduction of not only carbon but also sulfur and 
nitrogen oxides.72 
Even when compared with a flexible cap-and-trade system, carbon taxes provide 
more of a constant incentive to reduce emissions until they are eliminated.73 This 
incentive exists even if the cost of cutting emissions is higher or lower than the 
expected cost.74 For example, an emissions cap would fail to incentivize firms to 
further reduce emissions where new technology made it much cheaper to make their 
reductions.75 But a carbon tax would supply an incentive as long as reduction costs 
less than paying the tax. A steadily increasing carbon tax would “eliminate 
fluctuations in the cost of emissions and allow both producers and consumers of 
energy to more confidently determine when and to what extent emissions should be 
reduced.”76 Carbon taxes provide another advantage that is left unresolved by cap-
and-trade systems: price certainty. A carbon tax is fixed as a percentage of output 
until further changed by the government.77 This price certainty allows energy 
producers to make smart long-term investment decisions and reduces the risk of such 
investments. 
B. Revenue 
The revenue produced by a carbon tax is a major policy advantage that allows for 
much broader economic and social impacts. Carbon taxes can either be revenue 
positive or revenue neutral. There is debate about which mode is preferred,78 but each 
design nevertheless presents revenue possibilities that other methods of climate 
regulation do not. The revenue generated by a carbon tax allows for several viable 
spending possibilities. For example, a revenue-neutral carbon tax can counteract its 
regressive nature by redistributing the revenue in the form of a rebate check, 
reduction in income or payroll taxes, or increase in the earned income tax credit.79 In 
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these ways, the revenue can be used to maintain the desired level of overall 
progressivity within the tax system. However, there is a tradeoff to utilizing the 
revenue in such ways. Options most valuable to low-income taxpayers are much less 
amenable to economic efficiency concerns because they do nothing to correct for the 
“distortive effects of existing taxes.”80 The CBO corroborates this sentiment and 
asserts that some uses, such as reducing the deficit or cutting marginal tax rates, can 
offset the economic costs while others, such as compensating groups adversely 
affected by the tax, would not.81 On the other hand, economists believe that a 
revenue-generating carbon tax is able to offset the burden it places on low-income 
taxpayers and provide revenue for other purposes.82 Other potential uses of carbon 
tax revenue include funding research and development to aid transition into a low-
carbon economy.83 
Shi-Ling Hsu distinguishes between these options and argues that carbon tax 
revenues are more than just economic.84 The choice over how to utilize the revenue 
carries heavy social and political considerations as well. Some spending options 
benefit the wealthy and others benefit low- and moderate-income households.85 
Options such as reducing the personal or corporate income tax, for instance, are more 
favorable to higher-income individuals because these taxpayers account for a larger 
proportion of income tax revenue.86 Reducing payroll or consumption taxes or 
issuing lump sum rebates would directly aid low-income consumers.87 For this 
reason, carbon tax revenue presents more of a struggle of competing values than 
other taxes. Carbon tax advocates are forced to favor one group of taxpayers at the 
expense of another regardless of whether they are advancing a revenue-neutral or 
revenue-positive design. Simply choosing to direct revenue to the general treasury 
might be enough to lose whatever popular support a carbon tax proposal may have. 
C. Regressiveness 
Carbon taxes increase the cost of fossil fuels to account for the social costs of 
burning such fuels. This encourages energy conservation and the use of clean energy 
alternatives that emit less negative environmental effects, however, there is a 
downside. Any upward movement in energy prices caused by adding the social costs 
to the price of fossil fuels has a larger negative impact on low- and middle-income 
households. This is because low-income individuals and households devote a larger 
fraction of their budget to energy costs than high-income households.88 Since low 
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energy prices are most beneficial to low-income consumers, low- and moderate-
income households will feel most of the tax burden under any carbon tax or trading 
system.89 Using data from 2003, Gilbert Metcalf and David Weisbach estimate that 
a carbon tax would constitute 0.81% of the top decile’s annual income but 3.74% of 
the bottom decile’s income.90 The carbon tax is most widely criticized for this modest 
to high regressiveness.91 
It is possible that the regressiveness of a carbon tax is not as extensive as 
opponents assert and whatever level of regressiveness that does exist can be corrected 
for through the use of supplementary policies. First, the level of regressiveness varies 
depending on the measure of the tax burden used. Studies that examine energy costs 
as a proportion of income show more dramatic effects on the poor than studies that 
use an expenditure measure of incidence.92 In their 2009 study, Kevin Hassett et al. 
find that the burden on the bottom decile is 3.74% when measured as a proportion of 
annual income but 1.16% of lifetime consumption.93 They suspect that this is partly 
caused by “transitory income shocks” that “exacerbate the apparent regressivity” 
when using the annual income measure.94 This makes carbon taxes appear more 
regressive. Even though energy taxes cannot be deemed progressive, they place less 
of a burden on the poor and middle class than much of the opposing rhetoric would 
indicate.95 
While the regressive quality of carbon taxes is real, no matter the disagreement 
over its extent, there are measures available to counteract the unequal distribution of 
negative side effects. As previously discussed, this may take the form of a rebate, 
reduction in income taxes, or increased tax credit.96 According to Metcalf and 
Weisbach, this should take the form of adjustments to the tax system itself rather 
than adjustments to the design of the carbon tax.97 Otherwise, the environmental 
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incentives of the carbon tax become distorted because the carbon emissions would 
no longer be priced equal to the marginal damages.98 
D. Practicality of Implementation 
A carbon tax is the easiest climate policy option to implement and adjust.99 The 
tax can be applied to a relatively small number of producers, which makes 
administration easier to streamline.100 It is also more stable once implemented and 
less prone to political manipulation.101 However, there are initial administrative 
hurdles that come with implementing the tax. First, the most socially and 
economically efficient price is difficult to determine. The classic definition of a 
carbon tax calls for a price equal to the marginal social cost,102 the estimation of 
which is “complex, varied, and controversial.”103 In a 2013 survey, the mean social 
cost of carbon was determined to be $196 per ton with a standard deviation of 
$322.104 But even though the exact carbon emissions of each source are difficult to 
measure, the “volume and carbon content of fossil fuels burned” can serve as a 
substitute.105 Furthermore, even a modest carbon tax can send the “right kind of price 
signals” without the stress of determining the most optimal price.106 
III. NORTHEASTERN STATE CARBON TAX PROPOSALS 
The current direction of federal climate policy gives state and regional proposals 
backing and possibility for success. Legislators in five northeastern states have 
introduced bills to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through the use of a carbon tax 
or fee.107 The public opinions and political conditions of the northeastern United 
States provide a strong basis for such proposals: the evidence of climate change is 
widely accepted, states have adopted clean energy regulations, and states must 
import fossil fuels.108 The northeastern states already participate in the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a regional cap-and-trade program that regulates 
the electricity sector.109 A carbon tax would help these states reach their emission 
reduction goals. 
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The various carbon tax proposals diverge in important respects, including how to 
use revenue, prices, and gradual price increases. For example, Vermont and 
Massachusetts’s proposals both start at $10 per ton, but Vermont’s tax would 
increase up to $100 while Massachusetts’s tax would only reach $40.110 Different 
standards of living is one explanation for the price discrepancies, yet there are 
concerns of increased competition among states. Nevertheless, the proposals would 
be significant if adopted. This is especially true of the Massachusetts proposals 
because the Rhode Island and Connecticut bills are contingent upon a carbon tax 
being passed in Massachusetts.111 
A. Massachusetts Carbon Tax Proposals 
Two carbon tax proposals have been introduced in the Massachusetts state 
legislature, one in the House and one in the Senate. If either bill is adopted, 
Massachusetts will become home to the first carbon tax in the United States. The 
northeastern United States generally presents a promising location to propose the 
nation’s first carbon tax, but Massachusetts in particular harbors a hospitable social 
and political environment for such legislation because the state leads the country both 
“in energy efficiency and the size of its clean tech economy.”112 A state tax might 
also be favored because it would help the Commonwealth achieve its target reduction 
in emissions set by the Global Warming Solutions Act.113 The proposals will be 
introduced separately and their differences highlighted. 
1. Senate Bill 1821 
In early 2017, Massachusetts State Senator Michael Barrett introduced his third 
carbon-pricing bill since 2013, Senate Bill 1821 “An Act Combating Climate 
Change” (“S.1821”).114 The bill proposes a carbon tax of ten dollars per ton, rising 
annually by five dollars until it reaches forty dollars.115 The bill is a revenue-neutral 
carbon tax proposal.116 The revenue, estimated to be between $350 and $400 million 
in the first year of the tax, 117 is to be deposited into a “greenhouse gas emissions 
charges rebate fund.”118 It would cover “reasonable administrative costs” associated 
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with the tax, with the rest being returned to households and businesses to minimize 
the economic impacts.119 Residents would receive an equal rebate, but residents of 
rural areas would receive additional compensation in the form of a “motor vehicle 
fuel rebate” due to high transportation costs and lack of available substitutes.120 
Employers would be entitled to rebates based on their proportional share of statewide 
employment, which is reassessed annually.121 This encourages businesses to employ 
more full-time employees, as a greater company workforce will ensure a greater 
return.122 
Economists in support of this bill argue that this approach is cost effective. This 
was reflected in the testimony of Professors of Economics Gilbert Metcalf and 
Christopher Knittel given before the Joint Committee of Telecommunications, 
Utilities and Energy (“Joint Committee”) at the public hearing held on June 20, 
2017.123 The proposal provides a strong incentive to reduce consumption and allows 
consumers discretion in deciding how to adjust to the tax. The proposed carbon tax 
would also help the state continue compliance with RGGI and reach its target 
reduction goals. After the sixth year of the tax, House and Senate committees would 
assess whether any accommodations are to be made to the charges.124 
2. House Bill 1726 
Representative Jennifer Benson sponsored House Bill 1726 entitled “An Act to 
Promote Green Infrastructure, Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and Create Jobs” 
(“H.1726”).125 This bill proposes a carbon tax starting at twenty dollars per ton of 
carbon emissions, increasing by five dollars until the rate is forty dollars.126 H.1726 
is a revenue-positive proposal.127 Eighty percent of the revenue is to be returned to 
households and employers through rebates.128 The remaining revenue would fund a 
Green Infrastructure Fund (GIF) to “support investments in transportation, resiliency 
and clean energy projects . . . prepare for climate change impacts, assist low-income 
households and renters in reducing their energy costs, and create local economic 
development and employment.”129 Eighty-five percent of GIF funds would be 
distributed to municipalities to accomplish three prescribed purposes.130 The plan 
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would allocate one-third of GIF funds to areas with income levels in the lowest third 
of the statewide median income.131 
H.1726 was discussed by the Joint Committee at its June 2017 public hearing. 
Representative Jennifer Benson defended her revenue-positive bill and argued that 
consumers who emit less carbon would receive a greater rebate, thus shaping 
behaviors.132 The green fund would be able to finance new energy projects and 
support collaboration among towns and municipalities.133 Other supporters present 
at the hearing claimed that H.1726 is even attractive to rural constituents; there is a 
thirty percent premium for residents who do not have alternative transportation.134 
IV. CAN STATE-LEVEL CARBON TAXES WORK? 
The interaction of state and federal regulations presents challenges to effective 
climate policy. For one, states have generally followed the lead of the federal 
government and used the federal tax system to shape their own tax structures.135 
Although these similarities allow substantial benefits to states in terms of compliance 
and administrative costs, federal policy “interfere[s] directly with states’ taxing 
authority” and creates “spillover effects” into state policy possibilities.136 For 
example, states originally took the lead on environmental issues, but this changed 
with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.137 However, it is still possible 
for innovative state climate policies to influence future federal action.138 Considering 
the likelihood that both federal and state legislatures will continue to regulate this 
area, unilateral state policy has the potential to influence the national climate change 
policy agenda. 
In response to the federal government’s disfavor of proactive climate policy, 
“grim news of rising temperatures, collapsing ice shelves, and massive flooding,” a 
new sense of urgency toward climate policy has emerged.139 The states may be better 
able to enact their own carbon laws with federal climate policy seemingly at an 
impasse.140 In fact, the Carbon Tax Center issued a state-by-state analysis and opined 
that carbon taxation could be an effective and feasible policy move for local 
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governments.141 The political challenges present at the federal level may pose less of 
a barrier to enactment at the state level. The majority of state spending, for instance, 
is attributed to education and social welfare programs; this spending presents a highly 
acceptable use of revenue to the electorate.142 
Several state and local governments have recently revived the idea of state-level 
climate change legislation and made independent moves on climate policy.143 Until 
much more recently, state-level plans to reduce emissions have been business-
friendly cap-and-trade schemes.144 California adopted a program with the ambitious 
goal of reducing overall emissions to year 1990 levels by 2020, “further reduc[ing] 
emissions to eighty percent of 1990 levels by 2050.”145 Further, the California Air 
Resources Board plays a large role in enforcing the Obama-era automobile emissions 
standards.146 
Most recently, Washington State balloted Initiative 732, which proposed a fifteen 
dollar per ton carbon fee, set to steadily increase over the next few decades.147 In 
2007, Boulder, Colorado, adopted a tax on the electricity sector that has reduced 
emissions by 100,000 tons per year and generated $1.8 million in revenue.148 The 
city uses the revenue to issue rebates to businesses and homeowners and fund the 
city’s climate action program.149 These state and local climate change initiatives 
predate S.1821 and H.1726 but match the spirit and policy goals of the proposals. 
They support the potential effectiveness of the bills in reducing emissions and 
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represent a step forward in obtaining a more prominent place for the issue on the 
national policy agenda. 
This Part discusses the potential advantages and disadvantages of the 
Massachusetts carbon tax proposals from an economic, cultural, and social 
perspective. There are strong economic arguments on both sides of the state carbon 
tax debate, but the political and cultural significance of a state-level tax would 
nonetheless be extraordinary. Additionally, the resulting reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions would cause corresponding improvements in air quality and, however 
modest, the environment itself. In light of the available climate policy options and 
the effectiveness of the carbon tax, this Part evaluates S.1821 and H.1726 and argues 
that the balance between the benefits and costs of a state carbon tax weigh in favor 
of passing such a bill. 
A. Impact on State Economies & Cultures 
Even though such policies would be best implemented on a national level,150 
unilateral state action presents positive possibilities for the future of climate change 
legislation. The price-based quality of the carbon tax, as exemplified by both 
proposed carbon taxes discussed in this Note, allows state carbon taxes to work 
harmoniously with federal policy, should it ever be enacted. Lawrence Goulder and 
Robert Stavins identify possible problematic interactions between federal and state 
quantity-based climate regulations but find no comparable issues with price-based 
regulations.151 Although concern for business presents a persuasive reason to 
carefully consider state-level climate legislation, this Section will discuss ways in 
which the Massachusetts economy stands to see possible positive impacts from the 
current carbon tax proposals. 
For one, the Massachusetts carbon tax proposals are modest enough to be an 
attractive economic and fiscal policy option. S.1821 proposes a gradually increasing 
carbon tax starting at ten dollars.152 This increases the price of fossil fuel 
consumption by roughly 2.4% for residential customers and 4% for industrial 
customers.153 In December 2014, a study entitled Analysis of a Carbon Fee or Tax 
as a Mechanism to Reduce GHG Emissions in Massachusetts (the “Analysis”)154 
found that a revenue-neutral graduated tax on major sources of carbon emissions 
would “result in positive impacts on Massachusetts’ economic and employment 
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sectors while reducing CO2 emissions by five to ten percent.”155 This was echoed in 
arguments at the public hearing in front of the Joint Committee, many of which were 
made in general support of carbon pricing and not directly in favor of a specific 
proposal. Representative Solomon Goldstein-Rose claimed that a carbon bill would 
allow Massachusetts to develop and patent cheap energy technologies: “[T]he most 
significant benefit of carbon pricing is that it will create a market environment in 
Massachusetts that will drive a demand for cheap, clean energy and attract companies 
to move [to Massachusetts] to commercialize their new technologies.”156 Due to the 
fledgling state of the clean energy economy, a state carbon tax would encourage 
consumers to seek alternative sources of energy, potentially attracting new business 
to the state to fulfill the new demand. 
It is also important to note that although most states in the Northeast have voiced 
interest in adopting state carbon taxes, unilateral state action presents possible 
disadvantages in the realm of business competition. A state carbon tax would cause 
the price of exports from the taxing state to be much more expensive relative to 
imports from other states.157 Thus, the products subject to the state tax will be less 
attractive to both the export market and in-state consumers.158 The taxing state, acting 
on its own, is trying to correct for externalities that are not confined to its own 
borders. This tempts neighboring states to free ride on the effects of a carbon tax 
imposed within another state.159 In fact, Rhode Island and Connecticut’s proposals 
are tied to the success of the Massachusetts bills for exactly this reason.160 
The Massachusetts carbon tax proposals also have an employer incentive to 
encourage the creation of new jobs, thus strengthening the state economy. Under 
both S.1821 and H.1726, employer rebates are issued according to the firm’s number 
of full-time employees, which will encourage firms to expand and invest in labor.161 
However, the CBO finds that the carbon tax would reduce real wages, having a 
corresponding reduction on the available labor supply.162 While the economic 
advantages of adopting a carbon tax in the context of such a developing industry may 
be exaggerated, Massachusetts’s actions would still send powerful signals to 
neighboring states. Rhode Island Representative Aaron Regunberg’s testimony at the 
Joint Committee hearing spoke to his state’s reliance on Massachusetts policy, 
which, he claimed, has a “ripple effect” on the entire region.163 
A Massachusetts carbon tax would also have positive cultural impacts with the 
potential to influence federal policy. For instance, the tax implemented by Boulder, 
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Colorado, allows the city to maintain interest in the issues of climate change, energy, 
and overall community conservation.164 Massachusetts, as a population-dense 
jurisdiction already motivated to politicize climate change,165 has the ability to 
provide the model for state-level climate change legislation. The economic benefits, 
while admittedly uncertain to a point, would be highlighted by the legal and political 
benefits of implementing a state carbon tax and advocating for similarly-minded 
states to do the same. 
B. Distribution of Incidences 
Generally, states and localities have more regressive tax systems,166 the level of 
which varies widely across states and regions.167 These variances extend to energy 
taxes. Energy production, consumption, and cost differ across regions, so some areas 
will bear higher tax burdens than others.168 Tracey Roberts finds that different 
regions as a whole experience similar incidences, “but low-income residents in the 
Northeast, the Ohio Valley, and Florida will be more heavily impacted by a carbon 
tax . . . due to home heating and electricity costs.”169 However, more recent studies 
have determined that “[t]here is little variation across regions,” and any difference 
that may exist is “at best modest.”170 Kevin Hassett et al. show that these variances 
reached a highpoint in 1997 but fell under one-half of a percentage point by 2003.171 
The study, in fact, acknowledges these results as surprising “given the variation in 
weather conditions and driving patterns across the regions.”172 But these results are 
explained when the differences in the consumption of fossil fuels across regions are 
examined. For example, home heating oil is consumed in higher volumes in New 
England, gas in the East North Central region, and electricity in the West South 
Central.173 The different combinations of fuel usage equate to more similar totals.174 
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The incidences resulting from the implementation of S.1821 or H.1726 are not an 
overwhelmingly persuasive argument for rejecting either carbon tax proposal. The 
2014 Analysis found that low- and moderate-income Massachusetts households in 
the first, second, and third quintiles would experience a net gain or come out even 
under a carbon tax that distributes rebates either per person or per household.175 
Williams et al. echoed this finding for states across the Northeast: electricity prices 
in “California, the Northwest, and the Northeast are the least affected.”176 However, 
the Analysis did determine that “a per-person rebate, or a mixed system, would be 
more equitable than a per household rebate.”177 The adverse effects of a tax on certain 
groups are an important consideration when debating a tax proposal, but these 
concerns should not automatically block the passage of either bill. 
C. Miscellaneous Savings 
The reduction in greenhouse gas emissions would translate into positive health 
benefits and savings in healthcare costs. Few studies have focused on state-level 
outcomes for state-level carbon bills, but the Center for Health and the Global 
Environment at Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health conducted a study into 
the “health co-benefits” that might result from the air quality improvements effected 
by S.1821 and H.1726.178 The researchers built a model based on the “results of an 
economic model of the fuel use and carbon emissions reductions . . . health impact 
functions from the scientific literature . . . and standard health benefit valuation 
metrics.”179 The study concluded that the bills would save lives, reduce the 
occurrence of heart attacks, decrease hospitalizations due to cardiovascular and 
respiratory diseases, and save $2.9 billion in healthcare costs over the next twenty-
three years.180 If the health benefits from a single state carbon tax stand to be so 
significant, multiple state laws would have a profound effect on public health. 
The reduction in greenhouse gases resulting from the carbon tax would also offer 
benefits on the condition of the ecosystem itself. While the Massachusetts air quality 
study was focused on the health benefits of the carbon tax proposals, it also reported 
potential benefits to “crop productivity, farming, forestry, and reductions in acid 
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rain.”181 Air pollutants contribute directly to the production of smog and acid rain, 
which not only forces residents to breathe in dangerous chemicals but also dampens 
crop and timber productivity.182 A carbon tax would also have a two-fold effect on 
traffic and infrastructure issues. For one, the revenue from a revenue-positive 
proposal like H.1726 could fund transportation projects. A carbon tax, regardless of 
revenue use, would also encourage commuters to take advantage of public 
transportation, reducing congestion and the amount of vehicle emissions released 
into the atmosphere. 
CONCLUSION 
With the slight if not dismal possibility of imminent federal action on the issue of 
climate change, the states have the opportunity to play a major role in the area. States 
have several policy options to choose from, but the carbon tax has proven to be 
perhaps the most effective and efficient mechanism by which to curb carbon 
emissions. With the creation of a broad tax base, a state-level carbon tax can not only 
correct for issues such as regressiveness and competition between neighboring states 
but also further encourage collaboration on clean energy projects and technologies. 
The Northeast is the most promising region for such a tax in the United States, and 
Massachusetts presents a particularly favorable social and political climate for a state 
carbon tax. Accordingly, two proposals have been introduced to the Massachusetts 
Senate and House, S.1821 and H.1726.183 The bills diverge in the use of revenue, one 
being revenue neutral and the other revenue positive, respectively. However, the 
proposals further many of the same policy goals and would reach similar results. 
While the actual economic prospects under such a tax are hardly definitive, it is 
possible to support a state carbon tax under many different policy objectives. The 
increased price of carbon emissions would encourage investment in clean energy 
technologies and potentially attract new businesses to fill the demand for alternative 
energy sources. The rebates issued to households and employers under both tax plans 
counteract the regressiveness and incentivize the creation of new jobs in the state. As 
a collateral benefit, a state carbon tax would also impact the political and cultural 
scene by keeping the climate change issue fresh and potentially influencing federal 
policymakers. The passage of a carbon tax in Massachusetts, or any state for that 
matter, would be remarkable. It would represent an important step forward in 
addressing the climate change crisis and hopefully be the start of more proactive 
government action in the area. 
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